BIMI Setup Guide: SVG Logos, VMCs & DMARC Prerequisites
BIMI setup from DMARC enforcement to verified logos: building an SVG Tiny PS file, choosing a VMC or CMC, publishing the record and which inboxes display it.
DKIM Setup Guide: Selectors, Keys & DNS Records
Set up DKIM correctly: how selectors and the _domainkey DNS record work, 2048-bit keys, canonicalization and dual-selector rotation.
DMARC Setup Guide: Records, Policies & Rollout
Publish DMARC the right way: tag syntax (p, sp, pct, rua, adkim), alignment rules, external report authorization and the staged none-quarantine-reject rollout.
SPF Record Setup: Syntax, Lookups & Common Mistakes
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) tells receiving servers which hosts may send email for your domain. It is the foundation of email authentication: DMARC cannot pass without it, Gmail and Yahoo require it for bulk senders, and a broken record quietly pushes legitimate mail toward spam. This guide covers the syntax, the lookup limits that break records, and the most common mistakes.
New to the three-protocol picture? Start with the email authentication overview; this guide covers SPF alone.
What SPF actually checks
SPF validates the envelope sender — the MAIL FROM (Return-Path) address exchanged during the SMTP transaction — not the From header the recipient sees. The two are independent: your marketing platform may put its own bounce domain in Return-Path while displaying your brand in From, and an attacker can mix them freely.
The practical consequence: a passing SPF check does not by itself protect your visible From domain. Binding the SPF result to the header domain is DMARC's job, via alignment — which is why DMARC sits on top of SPF rather than replacing it.
Anatomy of an SPF record
SPF is a single DNS TXT record at the root of your domain. The value must start with v=spf1, followed by mechanisms, and should end with an all mechanism covering unmatched hosts. A complete, working record for a company sending from its own server plus Google Workspace and Microsoft 365:
v=spf1 ip4:203.0.113.10 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
The mechanisms:
ip4:/ip6:— authorize an IP address or CIDR range directly. Consumes no DNS lookup.include:— delegate to another domain's SPF record (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365). Each include, and everything nested inside it, consumes lookups.a/mx— authorize the IPs behind the domain's A or MX records. Every written occurrence counts toward the lookup limit.exists:— matches if the given name resolves; rarely needed.ptr— reverse-DNS matching. Do not use it — RFC 7208 discouragesptras unreliable and expensive, and large receivers ignore it.
Qualifiers:
+— pass (the default when no qualifier is written)-— fail: host explicitly unauthorized~— softfail: a weak failure, typically treated as suspicious but not rejected?— neutral: no assertion either way
In practice the choice is between ~all and -all. Start with ~all while you are still discovering senders; once every legitimate source passes consistently in DMARC reports, tighten to -all. Going straight to -all on day one reliably breaks mail you did not know you were sending.
The 10-lookup limit
RFC 7208 caps SPF evaluation at 10 DNS lookups per check. Every include, a, mx, ptr, exists and redirect term counts — including lookups triggered inside included records, and each additional occurrence if you write a or mx more than once. Exceed the limit and the record evaluates to permerror, which receivers treat as a broken record — worse than no SPF at all.
A second, lesser-known limit: at most 2 void lookups (queries returning NXDOMAIN or no usable answer) — more also triggers permerror. The usual cause is an included domain that has since deleted its own SPF record.
Modern SaaS stacks burn lookups fast: Google Workspace costs 3, Microsoft 365 around 4 through nested includes, and each marketing or helpdesk tool adds more. Near the ceiling, replace includes with literal ip4: blocks or flatten automatically — see SPF flattening with Cloudflare for the trade-offs.
TXT record rules: one record, 255-character strings
Three DNS-level constraints apply:
- Exactly one SPF record per domain. Two TXT records that both start with
v=spf1producepermerror. If a provider tells you to add an SPF record and you already have one, merge its mechanisms into your existing record instead of publishing a second. - TXT only. The dedicated SPF DNS record type was obsoleted years ago; receivers only read the TXT version. Values in any other record type do nothing.
- 255 bytes per string. Longer values must be split into multiple quoted strings — for example
"v=spf1 ip4:203.0.113.10 include:_spf" ".google.com ~all"— which DNS clients concatenate before evaluation. Most panels split automatically, but pasting a pre-split value into a panel that does not is a classic breakage.
Subdomains do not inherit SPF
SPF is evaluated against the exact envelope domain. A record on yourdomain.com does nothing for mail from billing.yourdomain.com — the receiver looks for SPF there and, finding none, gets no authorization signal. For every subdomain that does not send mail, publish a null SPF record to close the spoofing gap:
v=spf1 -all
It states plainly that nothing from the subdomain is legitimate — exactly what you want for www, internal hostnames and parked names.
Step-by-step: publishing your SPF record
- Inventory your senders. List everything that sends mail as your domain: your own mail server, Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, CRM, marketing, billing, helpdesk, website forms, printers and scanners emailing over SMTP. A missed sender becomes a DMARC failure later — see the DMARC troubleshooting guide.
- Build the record. Use
ip4:entries for your own infrastructure and oneinclude:per SaaS provider. The SPF Generator assembles the record and shows the lookup cost as you add mechanisms. - Publish one TXT record at yourdomain.com, ending in
~all. - Verify immediately. Run the SPF Checker — it parses every mechanism, counts nested lookups, and flags
permerrorconditions before your users do. - Watch and tighten. Once DMARC reports show every legitimate sender passing, change
~allto-all.
Verify it end to end
After the record is live, send a test message to a Gmail account and open Show original — you want spf=pass next to the envelope domain. For the full picture, run the Email Health Check, and inspect raw DNS answers with the TXT Lookup tool when you suspect panel-side splitting. Provider walk-throughs: Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, DNS providers.
Common mistakes
- Publishing two SPF records. A second v=spf1 TXT record guarantees
permerror— there is one record, and everything lives inside it. - Publishing SPF as the wrong record type. The SPF record type is obsolete and ignored; the value must be in TXT.
- Including a domain that does not send your mail. It adds lookups without authorization — and if that domain later breaks its record, you inherit the
permerror. - Exceeding 10 lookups. The record looks fine in the panel but fails at every receiver. Count nested includes, not just the terms you typed.
- Believing SPF protects the From header. It does not. SPF authenticates the envelope domain; protecting the visible From domain requires alignment, enforced by DMARC.
Frequently asked questions
Can I have one SPF record per provider?
No. A domain carries exactly one SPF record; multiple v=spf1 TXTs are a hard permerror. Combine all providers inside the single record.
My SPF passes but DMARC fails — why?
Almost always alignment: the domain that passed SPF (the envelope sender) does not match the From domain the recipient sees. Use a provider that lets you set your own Return-Path domain, or rely on DKIM alignment — the full diagnostic is in how to fix DMARC failures.
Do subdomains need their own SPF records?
Yes, if they send mail — SPF does not inherit. A subdomain that never sends should carry the null record v=spf1 -all so it cannot be spoofed.
Should I use ~all or -all?
~all during rollout, while your sender inventory is uncertain; -all once DMARC reports confirm every legitimate source passes. ?all is rarely useful, and +all authorizes the entire internet — never use it.
How long until my SPF change takes effect?
Usually minutes. The ceiling is your record's TTL — set it to an hour or less while iterating, and allow 24–48 hours for the slowest caches.
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