BIMI Setup Guide: SVG Logos, VMCs & DMARC Prerequisites
BIMI setup from DMARC enforcement to verified logos: building an SVG Tiny PS file, choosing a VMC or CMC, publishing the record and which inboxes display it.
DKIM Setup Guide: Selectors, Keys & DNS Records
Set up DKIM correctly: how selectors and the _domainkey DNS record work, 2048-bit keys, canonicalization and dual-selector rotation.
DMARC Setup Guide: Records, Policies & Rollout
Publish DMARC the right way: tag syntax (p, sp, pct, rua, adkim), alignment rules, external report authorization and the staged none-quarantine-reject rollout.
How to Create a Strong Password (2026): Length, Examples & Rules
A strong password is not a password that looks complicated. It is a password that was generated in a way an attacker cannot reproduce, is long enough that guessing it stays impractical, and exists on exactly one account.
Those three properties — unpredictability, length, and uniqueness — are the whole game. Everything else people associate with "strong" passwords (a capital letter here, an exclamation mark there, a number at the end) is decoration that password-cracking tools learned to skip years ago.
This guide gives you the actual numbers: how many bits of entropy different password shapes contain, how long a password has to be before offline cracking becomes impractical, 40+ worked examples across four construction styles, and the specific habits that turn a 16-character password into something a laptop chews through in an afternoon.
Need one right now? The random password generator creates passwords locally in your browser using the Web Crypto API and shows the real entropy figure, not a made-up strength label. If you want something you can actually type from memory, use the passphrase generator instead — it draws from the EFF 1,296-word list and reports the true entropy of every phrase.
What actually makes a password strong
Password strength is measured in bits of entropy: the base-2 logarithm of how many equally likely passwords could have produced the one you chose. A 4-digit PIN has 10,000 possibilities, so it has log₂(10,000) ≈ 13.3 bits. A 12-character password drawn from 62 characters (upper, lower, digits) has 62¹² ≈ 3.2 × 10²¹ possibilities, which is 71.5 bits.
Every extra bit doubles the work an attacker has to do. That is why length dominates every other choice you can make.
| Property | Why it matters | How it fails in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Unpredictability | Entropy only counts if each character or word was chosen at random from a known set | Humans pick from a vocabulary of maybe 2,000 familiar patterns, not from 62¹² — so a "random-looking" password a person invented often has 25–35 bits, not 70 |
| Length | Adds entropy linearly in the exponent — every character multiplies the search space | Padding a weak base with a year or an exclamation mark adds a handful of bits, not dozens |
| Uniqueness | A breach on one site cannot be replayed on another | Reusing one password with a per-site suffix (Base-Amazon, Base-Gmail) means one leak exposes all of them to a single rule |
| Not relying on a secret rule | If you can reconstruct the password from a rule you remember, so can cracking software with the same rule in its wordlist | Leet substitution, keyboard walks and "first letters of a sentence" are all standard attack rules now |
The uncomfortable implication: a password you invented is almost always weaker than the same-length password a machine generated. Human-chosen 12-character passwords typically test at 30–45 bits because people reach for names, dates, dictionary words and predictable substitutions. A generated 12-character password is a true 71.5 bits.
How long should a strong password be?
How long should a password be? The honest answer depends on how the site stores passwords, because that determines how fast an attacker can test guesses after a database leak.
- Slow hash (bcrypt with a modern cost factor, scrypt, Argon2id) — roughly 10⁴ guesses per second per GPU. This is what well-run services use. At this rate even an 8-character random password survives centuries.
- Fast hash (salted SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5) — roughly 10¹¹ guesses per second on a single high-end GPU. Still extremely common in older or self-built systems, and the reason "8 characters is fine" advice collapsed.
The table below uses both rates. Treat the slow-hash column as "what the site claims" and the fast-hash column as "what happens if the site is breached and the attacker gets the hashes".
| Password shape | Entropy | Slow hash (10⁴/s) | Fast hash (10¹¹/s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8-character password, 62-character set | 47.6 bits | ~690 years | ~36 minutes |
| 10-character password, 62-character set | 59.5 bits | ~2.7 million years | ~97 days |
| 12-character password, 62-character set | 71.5 bits | ~10 billion years | ~1,000 years |
| 14-character password, 62-character set | 83.4 bits | ~3.9 trillion years | ~3.9 million years |
| 16-character password, 62-character set | 95.3 bits | ~1.5 × 10¹⁷ years | ~15 billion years |
| 12-character password, 94-character set (all printable ASCII) | 78.6 bits | astronomical | ~138,000 years |
| 4-word EFF passphrase | 41.4 bits | ~8.8 years | ~28 seconds |
| 5-word EFF passphrase | 51.7 bits | ~11,000 years | ~10 hours |
| 6-word EFF passphrase | 62.0 bits | ~15 million years | ~1.5 years |
| 7-word EFF passphrase | 72.4 bits | astronomical | ~1,900 years |
Reading that table honestly produces three conclusions most password advice gets wrong:
- 12 random characters is the practical floor, 16 is the comfortable target. Twelve clears a thousand years even against fast hashes; sixteen clears it against anything.
- A 6-word passphrase is not automatically stronger than a 12-character random password. 62 bits versus 71.5 bits — the passphrase is behind. Its advantage is that you can type it from memory, not that it is mathematically superior.
- 4-word passphrases are only safe on sites with rate limiting and slow hashes. 28 seconds against a leaked fast hash is not a strong password, no matter how nice it sounds.
Practical targets by account type:
| Account | Target | Why this level |
|---|---|---|
| Primary email (the account that can reset everything else) | 16+ random chars, or 7-word passphrase | Compromise cascades to every account that sends a reset link here |
| Banking, payment, crypto | 16+ random chars, unique | Direct financial loss, and these sites are phishing targets |
| Work / SSO account | 14+ random chars, or organisational policy if stricter | One identity usually spans many internal systems |
| Password manager master password | 7-word passphrase or 20+ random chars | It is the only password you memorise, and it unlocks everything |
| Social / forums / one-off shops | 12+ random chars, still unique | Low value individually, but reused credentials are how credential-stuffing spreads |
The password generator has one-click presets for 12, 16 and 20 characters if you just want to hit these targets without thinking about it.
Strong password examples (40+)
Search results for "strong password examples" usually hand you a list of strong passwords. That is backwards: an example you copy from a public page is already burnt.
Do not reuse any string on this page. Every example below is published in plain text, which makes it worthless as a password by definition. They exist to show the shape of a strong password; generate your own with the same shape.
1. Random character passwords
True random draws from upper case, lower case, digits and symbols. These are the strongest per character, and the only realistic way to use them is a password manager.
| Example | Construction | Entropy |
|---|---|---|
kR7$mQ2v#Lp9 | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
tX4!bN8@wZ3^ | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
Hq6%rT1&yU5* | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
mJ9^sD3#fG7$ | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
pW2@cV8!kX4% | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
nB5*eR1$hY7& | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
dF8#tK3^mQ6! | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
zL4$gH7@vC2# | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
rN6!pS9&wB1* | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
cY3%jM5^uE8$ | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
qT1$vD4*eK8& | 12 chars, all four classes | ~78 bits |
aW7@xQ2#oI6!rB9 | 16 chars, all four classes | ~104 bits |
2. Passphrases
Words drawn uniformly from a list, joined by a separator. Readable, typeable, and the entropy is exactly words × log₂(list size). The examples below use the EFF Short Wordlist #1 shape (1,296 words, 10.34 bits per word) plus a two-digit number where noted.
| Example | Construction | Entropy |
|---|---|---|
harbor-violet-jacket-otter-93 | 5 words + 2 digits | ~58 bits |
copper-lantern-swim-badger-frost | 5 words | ~52 bits |
mango-ripple-tiger-envelope-6 | 5 words + 1 digit | ~55 bits |
pebble-orbit-wagon-cider-jump | 5 words | ~52 bits |
tundra-basil-rocket-wallet-47 | 5 words + 2 digits | ~58 bits |
willow-comet-puzzle-anchor-dew | 5 words | ~52 bits |
saddle-pepper-glide-moth-81 | 5 words + 2 digits | ~58 bits |
canyon-thimble-vine-brick-kite | 5 words | ~52 bits |
nectar-pilot-amber-sock-fox | 5 words | ~52 bits |
hollow-mint-razor-dune-cabin | 5 words | ~52 bits |
3. Structured hybrid passwords
A memorised skeleton with random segments inserted. Weaker than a fully random string because the structure is guessable — the entropy comes only from the random parts.
| Example | Construction | Realistic entropy |
|---|---|---|
V7-Lundo!Tq93 | random 2 + word + random 2 + 2 digits | ~40–45 bits |
Mav#2026-rkLp | word + year + random 4 | ~35–40 bits |
Blue!Otter_47x | word + word + digits + letter | ~45 bits |
Rk!9-mesa-Vine | random 2 + digit + word + word | ~45 bits |
Tq#4-Wren_Lp8 | random 2 + digit + word + random 2 | ~40 bits |
Ostrich9!Vine# | word + digit + word + symbol | ~35 bits |
Lp7$Mango!Rk | random 2 + digit + word + random 2 | ~40 bits |
Wren-42#Tundra | word + digits + word | ~33 bits |
Sage!8-Brick^Lp | word + digit + word + random 2 | ~38 bits |
Moth#5-Cider!Qz | word + digit + word + random 2 | ~38 bits |
Note the gap: these look about as strong as the random strings above, and land at roughly half the entropy. That is the cost of a guessable skeleton.
4. Pinyin and mixed-language patterns
Common with Chinese users: familiar pinyin syllables plus symbols. They are easy to type on both a phone and a keyboard, but the syllable inventory is small, so entropy is lower than the character count suggests.
| Example | Construction | Realistic entropy |
|---|---|---|
LanTian@7#Yun | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
HaiFeng!3$Song | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
QingWa-8#He | 2 pinyin words + digit | ~28 bits |
MuTou@9!Ren | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
XiaoYu#6$Zhou | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
ShanHu!2@Ling | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
BeiDou#7$Tan | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
LvZhou@4!Kai | 3 pinyin words + digit + symbol | ~35 bits |
35 bits is fine for a forum account and not fine for your email. If you want a Chinese-language password with real strength, a 7-syllable random draw plus a random symbol is a better shape than a meaningful phrase — or just use a generated random string and let the password manager store it.
Password ideas that you can actually remember
Search results for "password ideas" are usually lists of example passwords. That is backwards: an idea you copy from a list is already public. What you want is a generation method you can repeat, where the output stays secret even though the method is known.
Six methods, ordered from strongest to weakest:
Method 1 — Random words from a fixed list (diceware)
Formula: roll dice (or use software) to pick N words from a published list of M words. Entropy = N × log₂(M).
Example: copper-lantern-swim-badger-frost — 5 words from the EFF 1,296-word list = 51.7 bits.
Why it works: the method is public and the wordlist is public, but the selection is private. Someone who knows you use diceware still cannot narrow the space.
Weakness: at 5 words it is only 52 bits. Use 6–7 words, or add 2 random digits, for anything important. The passphrase generator does this and displays the exact figure.
Method 2 — Sentence acronym with forced randomness
Formula: take a sentence you will not forget, take the first letter of each word, then replace 2–3 positions with a random symbol or digit chosen by a rule that is not derivable from the sentence.
Example: "My grandfather repaired radios in a cold attic every Sunday" → MgrriacaeS → insert random characters → Mg7rri!acaeS.
Why it is weaker than it sounds: acronyms come from sentences, and sentences come from language. Cracking tools have rule sets for initials and common phrases. Realistic entropy for a 10-letter acronym is around 30–40 bits, not 60.
Method 3 — Three unrelated nouns plus a random tail
Formula: pick three concrete nouns that do not co-occur in normal text (a "picture password"), join them, then append 2 random characters.
Example: trampoline-cabbage-monastery-Q4
Entropy: roughly 3 × 9 bits for the nouns (a 500-word concrete-noun vocabulary is optimistic for a human) plus ~12 bits for the tail ≈ 39 bits. Acceptable for medium-value accounts, not for email.
Method 4 — Deliberate misspelling of a long word
Formula: take a word of 4+ syllables that is not in the top 10,000, misspell it in a consistent way, add a random digit pair.
Example: defenestration → defennestration → defennestration-84
Entropy: ~30 bits. Dictionary attacks include misspelling rules, so the "typo" buys less than one might hope.
Method 5 — Two-language mix
Formula: one word in your first language plus one in a second language, both concrete and unrelated, plus random characters.
Example: shuidianzhan-trampoline-7K
Entropy: ~40 bits if both words are outside the attacker's expected vocabulary. Weaker than it looks if the second language is English, because English wordlists dominate cracking tools.
Method 6 — Let the machine generate it and never memorise it
Formula: generate 16–20 random characters, store them in a password manager, and never learn them.
Example: aW7@xQ2#oI6!rB9 — 104 bits.
Why this wins: memory is the constraint that forces people toward weak patterns. Remove the constraint and the ceiling disappears. This is the correct answer for every account except the two or three you need to be able to access without your phone.
How to create a strong password, step by step
The sections above explain the theory. This is the practical sequence for how to make a strong password for a real account, ordered so that the common mistakes are avoided by construction.
- Classify the account. Can a reset link from this account reach your email? Is there money attached? Is it work SSO? That decides whether you need 12 characters or 16.
- Choose the shape. Random characters if you will store it. A 7-word passphrase if you must type it from memory (master password, device login, work SSO on a shared machine).
- Pick a length that clears the target, not the minimum. 16 random characters, or 7 words, covers every realistic threat including a leaked fast hash.
- Generate with a real random source.
crypto.getRandomValuesin the browser, or a reputable password manager. Do not useMath.random(), and do not trust a site that displays a "strength" score without showing the entropy behind it. - Store it before you use it. Save to the password manager first, then paste into the site. Typing it into the site first and trying to save afterwards is how people lose accounts to a mistyped character.
- Check it against breach data. The password manager or the site's own signup flow should flag known-breached passwords. Details in the breach section below.
- Turn on two-factor authentication (2FA). A TOTP app or a hardware key beats SMS, and either beats nothing. A strong password with no second factor still loses to a convincing phishing page.
- Record the recovery path. Recovery email, backup codes, and — for the password manager itself — a written emergency kit stored somewhere physical.
The mistakes that make a long password weak
Most advice about good passwords stops at "use a mix of characters". These are the habits that quietly cancel the length you paid for.
| Habit | Why it fails | Better move |
|---|---|---|
Leet substitution (P@ssw0rd, Adm1n!) |
Every cracking tool ships this rule. It converts a dictionary word into another dictionary word. | Use words the dictionary does not contain, or stop composing passwords from words at all |
Keyboard walks (qwerty, 1qaz2wsx, asdfghjkl) |
Enumerated explicitly in attack wordlists; looks random to humans, is trivially patterned to software | Any generated string |
| Personal data: names, birthdays, pets, teams, phone digits | All available from social media, and OSINT wordlists are built per-target | Nothing derived from your life |
One base plus a site suffix (Sunflower-Amazon, Sunflower-Gmail) |
One breach reveals the pattern, and every other account falls to a single rule | Truly independent passwords, which in practice means a manager |
Changing one character every 90 days (...7 → ...8) |
Predictable deltas are in every rule set, and frequent rotation pushes people toward weaker bases | Change on evidence of compromise, not on a calendar |
| Storing passwords in notes, spreadsheets, chat apps or email drafts | Synced to accounts that are themselves protected by weaker passwords; often unencrypted at rest | A dedicated password manager with an encrypted vault |
| Sharing one login across a team | No audit trail, no way to revoke one person, and rotation breaks everyone | Individual accounts; shared secrets only in a manager with per-person access |
| Answering "security questions" truthfully | Mother's maiden name and first school are public-record or social-media facts | Treat them as extra passwords: random strings stored in the manager |
How to remember a strong password
You cannot memorise 60 accounts. You can memorise two or three. If you need a memorable strong password rather than a stored one, the realistic architecture is:
- One master passphrase for the password manager: 7 words, memorised through repetition, never typed into anything except the manager.
- One device passcode that unlocks the phone or laptop holding the manager.
- One recovery code printed and stored physically, for the day the phone is lost.
- Everything else: generated, stored, never seen again.
For the master passphrase specifically, three techniques that work:
- Type it daily for two weeks. Muscle memory beats rote recall. Type it, do not paste it.
- Attach a scene, not a story. "copper lantern swim badger frost" is easier to hold as one absurd image than as five separate words.
- Never write it in a file. If you must have a written copy during the learning period, put it on paper in a drawer, and destroy it once the muscle memory settles.
One warning about memory aids: if the mnemonic is derivable from something public — a song lyric, a quote, your own posted sentence — it is not a secret. The mnemonic should only tell you which random words you picked, not how to derive them from shared text.
Password managers vs. memorising
| Approach | Strength ceiling | Failure mode | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dedicated password manager (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePassXC, Proton Pass) | Unlimited — 20+ random characters per account | Master password lost or vault not backed up | Recommended default |
| Browser built-in manager (Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Edge) | High, and far better than reuse | Tied to the browser profile; weaker sharing and audit features | Acceptable, and much better than nothing |
| Memorising everything | Low — people converge on 25–35 bits and reuse | Forgetting, then resetting to something weaker | Does not scale past 3–4 accounts |
| Paper notebook | High against remote attackers | Physical loss, theft, photographing; no portability | Reasonable as an offline backup, not as the primary store |
| Reuse with variations | Effectively one password for all accounts | One breach compromises everything | Worst option that still "works" |
When choosing a manager, the features that actually matter are: end-to-end encryption with a published design, a real export path (so you are never locked in), TOTP support, and a clear answer to "what happens if the company disappears". Brand recognition is not on the list.
How to check whether your password has leaked
The useful check is on your email address, not on the password itself. Services like Have I Been Pwned index breached accounts by address and tell you which breaches included your data and what kind of data was exposed.
If you want to test a password without sending it anywhere in the clear, Pwned Passwords uses k-anonymity: your client hashes the password with SHA-1, sends only the first 5 hex characters of the hash, and receives every hash suffix in that bucket — typically hundreds of thousands of entries. The server never sees the password, and never sees enough of the hash to identify it.
Do not type a real password into an arbitrary "password strength test" website. There is no way for you to verify that it is not posting the value, and there is no rate limit on someone else's server logs.
If an account does appear in a breach:
- Change that password, and change every account that shares it.
- Revoke active sessions — a stolen session token survives a password change on many services.
- Check mail rules and forwarding addresses on the account. Attackers add silent forwarding before they change anything visible.
- Check recovery email and phone numbers. If those were changed, you are looking at an active takeover, not just a leak.
- Enable a second factor if it was not on.
What the official rules actually say
NIST SP 800-63B is the reference most enterprise password policies are (loosely) derived from, and its current guidance contradicts a lot of office policy that is still enforced:
| Old habit | Current guidance | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum 8 characters, must include upper, lower, digit and symbol | Minimum 8, and the current revision raises the single-factor floor to 15; do not impose composition rules | Composition rules produce Password1!-shaped passwords and measurable predictability |
| Force a change every 60–90 days | Do not force periodic rotation; force a change on evidence of compromise | Rotation degrades password quality and has no measurable benefit |
| Reject passwords with symbols outside a whitelist | Accept all printable ASCII including space, and support at least 64 characters | Long passphrases are the recommended shape, and they contain spaces |
| Let users set anything | Screen new passwords against a list of known-breached and commonly-used passwords | Blocks the actual attack (credential stuffing) rather than a proxy for it |
| Give hints or knowledge-based recovery questions | Avoid knowledge-based authentication entirely | Answers are public or guessable, and often reused across services |
Compliance frameworks can add requirements on top of this — audit logging, MFA for privileged access, vaulting for shared secrets — but they generally do not require the composition-and-rotation pattern that NIST dropped. If your organisation still enforces 90-day rotation, the argument to change it is now well documented rather than a matter of taste.
Frequently asked questions
Is a 12-character password strong enough?
Twelve random characters from the full 62-character set is 71.5 bits, which survives about a thousand years against a leaked fast hash and far longer against a properly hashed one. It is enough for most accounts. Move to 16 for email, banking and anything that can reset other accounts — the extra four characters cost nothing when a manager generates them.
Is a "secure password" different from a "strong password"?
Not in any way that changes what you should do. "Secure" usually means the same three properties — long, random, unique — sometimes with an added implication that the site stores it safely, which is the part you cannot control. If a service advertises "bank-grade security" while capping passwords at 6 characters, the password is the least of your problems.
Is a 16-character password enough for everything?
Yes for practical purposes. 16 random characters is 95 bits, roughly 15 billion years against fast hashes. There is no realistic scenario where a longer password helps you and a 16-character one fails, provided it was actually randomly generated.
Are passphrases stronger than random passwords?
Per character, no. Per unit of memorability, yes — which is the point. A 6-word EFF passphrase is 62 bits; a 12-character random password is 71.5. If you can store the random password, store it. If you must remember it, a 7-word passphrase (72 bits) is the better trade.
Does adding a capital letter and a symbol help?
Only if those characters were chosen randomly. If the rule is "capitalise the first letter and append an exclamation mark", the search space does not grow by 26 × 32 — it grows by one predictable rule that every cracking tool already applies. Length beats decoration.
How often should I change my password?
When there is evidence of compromise: a breach notification, a suspicious login, a shared device, or a phishing attempt you may have fallen for. Not on a calendar. Periodic forced rotation is explicitly discouraged by NIST because it produces predictable increments and weaker base passwords.
Is a Chinese-character password strong?
Mathematically a random 8-character Chinese password has a large search space, but in practice it is weaker than the count suggests. Many systems silently reject or mangle non-ASCII, input methods and clipboard managers may log it, and it is hard to type on foreign keyboards. If you want a Chinese-flavoured password, use pinyin as a shape (see the examples above) and accept that it lands around 35 bits — fine for low-value accounts, not for email.
Is it safe to let the browser save passwords?
Better than reuse, worse than a dedicated manager. Browser vaults are tied to the browser profile, are usually protected by the OS login rather than a separate master password, and are awkward to share across devices and browsers. Use one if the alternative is memorising; migrate to a dedicated manager if you have more than a handful of accounts.
Can I reuse a password if the site is unimportant?
No. The risk is not that the forum gets hacked — it is that the forum's user table, including your email and password, gets sold and replayed against your email, your bank and your work SSO. Credential stuffing does not care that the original site was low value.
What if I forget the password manager master password?
With a properly designed manager, nobody can recover it — that is the security property. What you need is not recovery but a plan: a written emergency kit stored physically, a family or emergency-access feature if the manager offers one, and an export you refresh periodically. Losing the vault should cost you an afternoon, not every account you own.
Should I use the password generator on this site or my password manager's?
Either. Both should use a cryptographically secure random source and neither should transmit the result. The generator here runs entirely in your browser and shows the entropy calculation, which makes it useful for checking whether a shape you invented is actually strong. For day-to-day use, generating inside the manager is one step fewer.
Where to go next
If you take one thing from this page: length plus randomness plus uniqueness, in that order of impact. Everything else is detail.
- Generate a 16-character password now: random password generator
- Need something you can type from memory: passphrase generator (EFF wordlist, honest entropy)
- Protecting a mail server or sending domain instead: start with SPF, DKIM and DMARC in the right order
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